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High degrees of relative risk aversion induce indeterminacy in cash-
in-advance economies. This paper ￿nds that Taylor-style policies can
pre-empt such sunspot equilibria. Speci￿c policy recommendations
depend on the fundamentals of the economy, i.e. the empirically true
value of coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
∗This paper was written while I was a DFG Heisenberg Fellow. I would like to thank the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for its hospitality as well as Chuck Carlstrom and
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Taylor Rules, Sunspot Equilibria. JEL classiﬁcation: E32, E52.1 Introduction
A well-established fact in monetary theory states that cash-in-advance mod-
els tend to display sunspot equilibria for weak degrees of intertemporal sub-
stitution (see for example Farmer [1999] in a model with a constant money
supply rule). This sort of real indeterminacy gives way for macroeconomic
instability to be generated by self-ful￿lling beliefs. People￿s non-fundamental
expectations ￿ i.e. beliefs that share no relation to the economy￿s fundamen-
tals ￿ can aﬀect allocations. The present paper identi￿es versions of the Tay-
lor interest rate rule that are able to pre-empt these self-ful￿lling equilibria.
In particular, I show that if the central bank adjusts the short-run nominal
interest rate exclusively and passively with respect to future in￿ation, then
sunspots do not matter for any parameter values of relative risk aversion.
Phrased alternatively, the enigma of instability caused by certain degrees of
risk aversion is completely eliminated by a pure in￿ation-targeting. However,
if output-targeting becomes an issue, then the Taylor rule￿s timing becomes
crucial in deciding how to set the policy parameters. Forward-looking rules
generate instability whenever output-targeting is strong. A strong output-
targeting is at place when the rule is backward-looking. I also demonstrate
that current-looking policies ￿ that is rules in which interest rates move with
current-period variables ￿ always produce indeterminacy. Lastly, I derive
observationally equivalent formulations of Taylor interest rules and money
growth rules: indeterminacy is not the result of simple nominal money sup-
ply rules.
The arguments which are developed in the current paper are framed
within a fully speci￿ed cash-in-advance environment. It is related to Carl-
strom and Fuerst￿s [2000] analysis of timing-aspects of interest rate rules.
My paper diﬀers from theirs in three key aspects, however. First, they limit
the analysis to logarithmic utility: preferences alone do not induce multiplic-
ity. Second, in their model the central bank￿s nominal interest rate targets
in￿ation only. The current paper considers versions of the original Taylor
rule in which the interest rate is increased or decreased according to what is
happening to both aggregate output and in￿ation. Furthermore, I present
new results on interest smoothing. My work here also shares similarities
with Christiano [2000] and Weder [2003] who introduce non-fundamental in-
stability through increasing returns in otherwise standard cash-in-advance
economies. They show that certain Taylor rules are able to tax away scale
economies and, as a consequence, multiple equilibria disappear.
22T h e a r t i ﬁcial economy
The model is a dynamic general equilibrium economy. It is populated by
immortal, atomistic households of measure one. Money is introduced by
imposing a cash-in-advance constraint on goods purchases. All markets are
perfectly competitive and prices are perfectly ￿exible. There is no physical
capital in the economy ￿ an assumption that is simply made to obtain ana-
lytical results.1 T h eb a s e l i n es p e c i ￿cation considers forward-looking Taylor
policies: the central bank targets short-run interest rates in response to ex-
pected variables. Rules that involve diﬀerent timings, i.e. current-looking
or backward-looking policies, are presented in Section 4. Overall, they tell
similar stories.
2.1 Preferences and technology
The representative agent￿s preferences order over an in￿nite sequence of con-
sumption, ct,a n dl a b o r ,ht. Lifetime utility is captured by the discounted





tu(ct,h t)0 < β < 1
where β is the discount factor and E0 stands for the rational expectations






− ht σ > 0.
Here, the relative risk-aversion coeﬃcient is denoted by σ.
Labor is supplied on competitive markets. Wt stands for the nominal
wage. In period t people can invest into a single risk-free asset, bt,b e a r i n g
a gross one-period rate of return Rt. Alternatively, the agents can set aside
cash, mt+1. The agent￿s budget constraint is given by
Ptct + bt + mt+1 ≤ Wtht + Rt−1bt−1 + mt + Nt
where Pt denotes the price level and Nt is the current period￿s cash transfer
from the central bank.
Money holdings are strictly positive since consumption purchases require
cash. The cash-in-advance constraint
Ptct ≤ mt + Nt + Rt−1bt−1 − bt
1The occurence of sunspot equilibria in CIA models does not arise from the absence of
capital (see also Carlstrom and Fuerst￿s [2000] for equivalence results).
3states that period t nominal consumption purchases must be covered by the
agents￿ cash holdings. I assume that the asset market opens ￿rst: consump-
tion trading is carried out after returning from the ￿nancial market and after
the current period￿s cash transfer from the central bank is received.
There is no physical capital in this economy; the production technology
is given by
yt = Aht A>0.
The ￿nal good can only be used for consumption purposes.
2.2 Policy
The central bank￿s operating target, Rt, is set based on the state of macro-
economic variables of the economy. In the baseline speci￿cation, I assume
that the central bank is forward-looking. The target￿s movements are syn-
c h r o n i z e dt oe x p e c t e dv a l u e so fi n ￿ation and aggregate output:
b Rt = ηEtb πt+1 + τEtb yt+1 η ≥ 0, τ ≥ 0. (1)
Carets denote percentage deviations of variables from their stationary state;
in a sense, b yt+1 can be interpreted as the output gap. Policies that involve
η > 1 (η < 1) are said to be actively (passively) targeting in￿ation. Policies
that set τ > 1 (τ < 1) are active (passive) output-targeting rules. Money
supply, MS
t , adjusts endogenously. The government does not purchase goods;
any potential seigniorage income is distributed back in lump-sum fashion and
does not aﬀect allocations at the margin.
3 Equilibrium dynamics
In symmetric equilibrium, yt = Aht = ct and MS
t = mt must hold for ∀t.










plus monetary policy (1). Taking a ￿r s t - o r d e rT a y l o rs e r i e sa p p r o x i m a t i o n













¯ > 1. If this condition is ful￿lled, the model
uniquely pins down the sequence of current and future consumption realiza-
tions and non-fundamental noise does not play any role. Otherwise, i.e. if




b ct +( ct+1 − Etb ct+1) ≡
σ
ησ − τ
b ct + st+1
in which i.i.d. shocks to expectations, st+1,i n ￿uence real allocations.
Let us compare the present model to one with an alternative policy:
money supply grows at an exogenous rate. Then, the reduced-form dynamics





and sunspot equilibria arise for σ > 2. Consequently, an observational equiv-
alence exists between a constant money growth rule and a forward-looking
Taylor policy that sets η∗ =1 −σ+τ/σ which can easily be seen by comparing
(2) and (3).
Next, I will analyze the dynamic implications of Taylor policies ￿ other
than η∗ ￿ with the goal of identifying parameter constellations in which the
indeterminacy disappears. I will begin with the special case of pure in￿ation-
targeting.
3.1 Inﬂation-targeting
If the central bank targets in￿ation only, i.e. τ =0 , the following result
applies: the term that describes relative risk vanishes and, unlike the case of
(exogenous) money-growth policies, the degree of relative risk has no eﬀect
on the equilibrium dynamics.
However, indeterminacy is still a possibility. A passive (active) in￿ation-
targeting is suﬃcient for determinacy (indeterminacy). The economics be-
hind the result are easily understood.2 If η > 1, the nominal rate and the





Now, suppose that people increase current consumption ￿ unrelated to any
changes in the economy￿s fundamentals. The consumption surge lowers the
2Since σ drops from (2), the special case of a pure in￿ation-targeting is, of course,
indirectly known from Carlstrom and Fuerst [2000].
5real rate as well as the nominal rate. Since the nominal rate is equivalent to
a distortion in a cash-in-advance economy, the lower rate is compatible with
the initial beliefs. The sunspots cycle is completed. If η < 1,t h ei n ￿uence
of sunspot expectations remains impossible since deviations from the steady
state would violate ￿rst-order conditions.
3.2 Output-targeting
Let us turn to a pure output-targeting. The dynamics of the economy are
given by




Unlike the pure in￿ation-targeting, the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion has a ￿rst degree in￿uence on the eﬀect of the monetary policy. Inde-
terminacy arises for τ > σ:as u ﬃciently weak output-targeting eliminates
sunspot equilibria. The following sequence of events depicts the economic
reasoning. Assume a belief-driven increase of today￿s consumption. The ex-
pected in￿ation rate falls. The next period￿s consumption purchases decline.
The new allocation can only be supported as long as today￿s nominal rate
falls. It falls since the drop in future output feeds back into today￿s nominal
rate which will decline. Thus, the initial beliefs are aﬃrmed.
It is noteworthy mentioning that ceteris paribus sunspot equilibria arise
for relatively small values of σ. This circumvents the result obtained in
models with a constant money supply rule in which it was low elasticities
of intertemporal substitution that lead to multiplicity (see Farmer[1999]).
I will show below that this result on macroeconomic stabilization does not
depend on the use of interest rate rules versus money growth rules. The
eﬀect is determined by the timing in the policy function under pure output-
targeting. For example, Section 4.2. will demonstrate that when the policy
is backward-looking, then large elasticities of intertemporal substitution lead
to multiplicity.
3.3 Output- and inﬂation-targeting
Next I will consider the general policy formulation of equation (1). Indeter-
minacy arises for
σ < τ/(1 + η) or σ > τ/(η − 1).
The second condition, of course, requires that η > 1.T h u s , t h e r e i s o n e
sunspot zone which can be excluded by passively targeting future-in￿ation
6as in Section 3.1. The other zone involves low values of the relative risk-
aversion parameter. To comprehend my argument￿s general plausibility, I
will turn to a numerical example. Let us assume that the central bank
follows the Taylor-principle and, in particular, it sets η =1 .53 and τ =0 .77
which are Taylor￿s [1999] estimates for the Federal Reserve Bank￿s policy
for the 1987-1997 period.3 Given Taylor￿s estimates, determinacy arises for
the parametric region 0.31 < σ < 1.45.4 B e a r i n gi nm i n dt h eo f t e nu s e d
logarithmic period-utility, i.e. σ =1 , one is inclined to conclude that the
Taylor-principle is an appropriate policy. However, σ may well be located
outside the determinacy region. For example, Hansen and Singleton [1983]
suggest that the coeﬃcient of relative risk is between zero and two. Thus,
information on the true value of σ is a pre-requisite for policy advice.
The pre-1980-period is often thought of as having been subject to expec-
tational instability created by the Federal Reserve (see for example Clarida
et al. [2000]). Taylor [1999] estimates for the 1960-1979 period are η =0 .88
and τ =0 .25. The less than one-for-one weight on in￿ation is con￿rmed by
other studies (e.g. Clarida et al. [2000]). Now, indeterminacy requires very
low and likely unreasonable values of relative risk aversion, i.e. σ < 0.13.
In other words, only the ￿rst of the above sunspot conditions binds. Given
my results, the Federal Reserve￿s pre-1980 policy may have been a suitable
choice in stabilizing expectational ￿uctuations.
4 Other versions of the Taylor rule
This Section presents various extension of the above results. I will begin
with the discussion of hybrid rules. This is followed by an analysis of interest
smoothing. I will then present results on current-looking and backward-
looking versions of the Taylor rule.
3Of course, the current economy is likely too simple to take these parameter values at
face value. However, the empirical literature has not produced clear point estimations:
the estimation uncertainty of the policy-estimates is perhaps as large as the variance of
σ-estimates. Thus, my discussion￿s main intend is to demonstrate that policies that are
approximately similar to the observed policies are not able to eliminate sunspots.
4Note that the results do not depend on the absence of physical capital. For example,
in a extension of this model with capital and a Cobb-Douglas technology, the regime shifts
at σ =1 .45 as well if the capital share is 0.42, β =0 .99, and the capital depreciation rate
is 2.5 percent per quarter. Put alternatively, the current paper does not consider physical
capital simply to generate analytical results.
74.1 Hybrid Taylor rules
Let us suppose that the central bank￿s policy is guided by the hybrid rule
b Rt = ηEtb πt+1 + τ b Yt η ≥ 0, τ ≥ 0
in which the central bank￿s operating target is a function of the current










and determinacy arises if τ/σ > η − 1. This condition implies that the esti-
mated 1987-1997 Taylor parameters ￿ η =1 .53 and τ =0 .77 ￿r e q u i r et h a t
σ > 1.45. The uncertainty about the true value of relative risk aversion im-
plies that the current model cannot answer the question if the Federal Reserve
Bank￿s policy was able to eliminate sunspots. However, if η < 1 (as in line
with pre-1980 estimates) then a clear-cut answer is possible. The inequal-
ity together with the sign-restrictions on the parameters ￿nds that a hybrid
rule that is passive with respect to in￿ation always produces indeterminacy.
In a sense, by reacting to current output ￿ and not to expected output as
in Section 3 ￿ the central bank is able to react to both key macroeconomic
variables while ruling out indeterminacy at the same time.
4.2 Interest rate smoothing
Giannoni and Woodford [2002] have suggested that backward-looking Taylor
rules￿ performances can be improved by adding lagged values of the nominal
interest rate. In particular, they consider rules like
b Rt = ρb Rt−1 + ηEtb πt+1 + τ b Yt ρ ≥ 0, η ≥ 0, τ ≥ 0 (4)
and ￿nd that a smoothing coeﬃcient, ρ, greater than one guarantees unique














Indeterminacy translates into 1/σ < (η + ρ − 1)/τ. A large smoothing coef-
￿cient does not guarantee uniqueness, quite on the contrary, it increases the
indeterminacy space. The Clarida et al. [2000] estimates for the pre- and
post￿Volcker period of the coeﬃcients in equation (4) imply that sunspots
arise for σ > 0.53 (and σ > 0.47).
84.3 Current-looking rules
Let us now formulate the policy
b Rt = ηb πt + τ b Yt η ≥ 0, τ ≥ 0
in which the central bank tunes the short-run rate following movements in
the currently observed variables. The dynamics of the economy transform
into the scalar equation
(τ − (1 + η)σ)Etb ct+1 =0 .
This equation pins down b ct+j∀j>0, however, the initial consumption level
is free: real indeterminacy applies for any policy parameter and any degree
of relative risk. The ￿nding that current-looking Taylor rules always imply
indeterminacy is reminiscent of Carlstrom and Fuerst￿s [2000] and Weder￿s
[2003] ￿exible price models which include endogenous investment.
4.4 Backward-looking rules
Lastly, I consider a monetary policy that is conducted so as to insure that
the nominal rate of interest satis￿es
b Rt = ηb πt−1 + τ b Yt−1 η ≥ 0, τ ≥ 0.





It is easy to see that there exists an observationally equivalent formulation to
an exogenous money growth-policy: the model reduces to (3) if the central
bank ￿xes the Taylor parameters such that η∗ =1 /(1 − σ)+τ/σ.








where the second condition only holds for a policy that aggressively works
against past in￿ation. Of course, the conditions in (7) simply reverse the
ones found for forward-looking rules. This is also reported by Carlstrom
and Fuerst [2000] who, however, only consider the special case σ =1and
τ =0 . Given Taylor￿s post-1979 parameters, i.e. η =1 .53 and τ =0 .77,
determinacy arises for σ < 0.31 and σ > 1.45. In particular, the economy is
indeterminate when period-utility is logarithmic in consumption.
9Let us consider two special cases of the backward-looking policy. A purely
aggressive in￿ation-targeting delivers a sunspot-free world and the degree
of relative risk does not in￿uence macroeconomic dynamics. On the other
hand, strong output-targeting is a strategy that insulates the economy from
endogenous cycles. Again, policy implications are ￿ipped on their head when
moving from forward-looking to backward-looking rules.
As of late, the Taylor rule debate has advised the monetary authority to
assign aggressive con￿gurations of the policy in which interest rates respond
to predetermined variables (see for example Carlstrom and Fuerst [1999] and
Benhabib et al. [2003]). The current paper challenges that view. Admittedly,
the proposal leads to determinacy when the central bank reacts aggressively
to past in￿ation only. Nevertheless, general recommendations for aggressive
policies are limited to a certain parametric region. Knowledge of the true
value of σ is central for submitting concrete policy proposals.
5 Summary
Recently it has become fashionable to formulate monetary policy in the form
of Taylor rules, i.e. it is assumed that the central bank sets the short-run
nominal interest rate in response to macroeconomic variables. The main
insight that emerges from the present paper is that Taylor-based monetary
policy may be used to eliminate a well-speci￿ed source of macroeconomic
instability. This is shown within a model in which indeterminacy arises
from preferences, i.e. from the intertemporal substitution motive in cash-in-
advance economies. However, speci￿c recommendations for monetary policy
depend on the fundamentals of the economy. In particular, knowledge of
t h et r u ev a l u eo fσ remains central before concrete policy proposals can be
made. There are only two policies that solve the complete problem: deter-
minacy arises independently of σ if the central bank either reacts exclusively
to aggressively to past in￿ation or exclusively passively to expected future
in￿ation.
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